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Abstract
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits
students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted R1 and R2. In round R1, the capacity of
each school is fixed and mechanism M1 finds a student optimal stable matching. In round R2,
certain parameters change, e.g., new students move into the City or the City is happy to allocate
extra seats to specific schools. We study a number of Settings of this kind and give polynomial time
algorithms for obtaining a stable matching for the new situations.
It is well established that switching the school of a student midway, unsynchronized with her
classmates, can cause traumatic effects. This fact guides us to two types of results: the first simply
disallows any re-allocations in round R2, and the second asks for a stable matching that minimizes
the number of re-allocations. For the latter, we prove that the stable matchings which minimize the
number of re-allocations form a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings. Observations about
incentive compatibility are woven into these results. We also give a third type of results, namely
proofs of NP-hardness for a mechanism for round R2 under certain settings.
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1 Introduction
School choice is among the most consequential events in a child’s upbringing, whether it
is admission to elementary, middle or high school, and hence has been accorded its due
importance not only in the education literature but also in game theory and economics. In
order to deal with the flaws in the practices of the day, the seminal paper of Abdulkadiroglu
and Sonmez [3] formulated this as a mechanism design problem. This approach has been
enormously successful, especially in large cities involving the admission of tens of thousands
of students into hundreds of schools, e.g., see [2, 1, 4, 18], and today occupies a key place in
the area of market design in economics, e.g., see [23, 21, 22, 13].
Once the basic game-theoretic issues in school choice were adequately addressed, research-
ers turned attention to the next level of questions. In this vein, in a recent paper, Feigenbaum
et. al. [12] remarked, “However, most models considered in this literature are essentially
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static. Incorporating dynamic considerations in designing assignment mechanisms ... is an
important aspect that has only recently started to be addressed.”
Our paper deals with precisely this. We define several settings for school choice in which
an instance is made available in the first round R1 and at a later time, in the second round
R2, some of the parameters change. Each setting asks for a pair of mechanisms, (M1, M2)
for finding matchings of students to schools in these two rounds. All our settings insist that
the matchings found in both rounds are stable. It will be convenient to classify our results
into three types. In Type A and B, both mechanismsM1 andM2 are required to run in
polynomial time.
1. Type A: MechanismM2 is disallowed to reassign the school of any student matched by
M1. We present two settings, A1 and A2.
2. Type B: MechanismM2 is allowed to reassign the school of students matched byM1;
however, it needs to (provably) minimize the number of such reassignments. We present
two settings, B1 and B2.
3. Type C: These are NP-hardness results – of mechanismM2 for four problems and of a
fifth problem, which involves only one round.
1.1 Our model and its justification
Our solutions to Type A and B results will strictly adhere to the following tenets; we justify
them below.
1. Tenet 1: All matchings produced by our mechanisms need to be stable.
2. Tenet 2: In Type A results, mechanismM2 is disallowed to reassign the school of any
student matched byM1, and in Type B results,M2 must provably minimize the number
of such reassignments.
3. Tenet 3: We want all our mechanisms to run in polynomial time.
The use of the classic Gale-Shapley [14] Deferred Acceptance Algorithm has emerged
as a method of choice in the literature. Our mechanisms also use this algorithm. Stability
comes with key advantages: First, no student and school, who are not matched to each other,
will have the incentive to go outside the mechanism to strike a deal. Second, it eliminates
justified envy, i.e., the following situation cannot arise: there is a student si who prefers
another student sj ’s school assignment, say hk, while being fully aware that hk preferred her
to sj .
Switching the school of a student midway, unsynchronized with her classmates – such as
when the entire class moves from elementary to middle or from middle to high school – is
well-known to cause traumatic effects, e.g., see [15]. It is for these reasons that in Type A
results, mechanismM2 is disallowed to reassign the school of any student matched byM1
and in Type B results,M2 must provably minimize the number of such reassignments. For
Type A results, we say thatM2 extends M to a stable matching M ′. For Type B results,
we say thatM2 computes a minimum stable re-allocation M ′ of M .
The strongest notion of incentive compatibility for a mechanism is dominant strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC), for students. This entails that regardless of the preferences
reported by other students, a student can do no better than report her true preference list,
i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all students. This immediately simplifies the task
of students and their parents, since they don’t need to waste any effort trying to game the
system. Furthermore, if students are forced to adjust their choices in an attempt to gain a
better matching, the mechanism, dealing with choices reported to it, may be forced to make
matches that are suboptimal for students as well as schools.
K. Gajulapalli, J. A. Liu, T. Mai, and V. V. Vazirani 21:3
Gale and Shapley [14] proved that if the Differed Acceptance Algorithm is run with
students proposing, it will yield a student-optimal matching, i.e., each student will get the
best possible school, according to her preference list, among all stable matchings. However,
this matching may be extremely unfavorable to an individual student – it may be matched
to a school which is very low on her preference list, giving her incentive to cheat, i.e., provide
a false preference list, in order to get a better matching. Almost two decades after the
Gale-Shapley result, Dubins and Freedman [8] proved, via a highly non-trivial analysis, that
this algorithm is DSIC for students. This ground-breaking result opened up the Gale-Shapley
algorithm to a host of highly consequential applications, including school choice.
In all of our results of Type A and B, mechanism M1 finds a student-optimal stable
matching using the Gale-Shapley Differed Acceptance Algorithm and is therefore DSIC for
students. For Setting B2 we provide a mechanism for round R2 that is DSIC. However, our
mechanisms for round R2 for the remaining three settings do not achieve this. Our main
open problem is to fix this. For completeness, and in order to motivate this open problem,
we discuss incentive-compatibility for each of these setting in Section 6.
It is well known that the set of Stable Matchings of a given instance forms a finite
distributive lattice [16]. By orienting the underlying partial order of this lattice appropriately,
the student-optimal stable matching can be made the top element of this lattice and the school
optimal matching the bottom element. For both Settings of Type B, we show that the set of
minimum stable re-allocations form a sublattice of this lattice. We provide polynomial-time
mechanisms for computing the top and bottom elements of this sublattice. For Setting B1,
we show that the top of the sublattice is also the top of the whole lattice, i.e., it is the
student-optimal stable matching; this is crucial for showing DSIC for B1.
1.1.1 Type A and B settings
The four settings involve the admission of students of a city, named City, into schools; the
preference lists of both students and schools are provided to the mechanisms. M1 computes
a student-optimal stable matching, M , over all the participants in R1. In R2 some of the
parameters over which M was defined are updated. M2 then modifies the matching M to
produce a new matching M ′ that is stable over the new parameters defined in R2.
For Settings of Type A, in round R1, the capacity of each school is fixed but in round
R2, the City is happy to allocate extra seats to specific schools per the recommendation of
mechanismM2, which in turn has to meet specified requirements imposed by the City. Let
L be the set of left-over students, those who could not be admitted in round R1.
In round R2 of Setting A1, the problem is to maximize the number of students admitted
from L, by extending M in a stability-preserving manner. In Setting A2, a set N of new
students also arrive from other cities and their preference lists are revealed to M2. The
requirement now is to admit as few students as possible from N and subject to that, as many
as possible from L, again in a stability-preserving manner. Finally, we give a procedure that
outputs all possible stability-preserving extensions of a given stable matching (which may be
exponentially many) with polynomial delay.
For Settings of Type B, the capacity of each school is fixed in R1, but in R2 the City
has to deal with the arrival of new students and new schools. This could lead the matching
found byM1 to no longer be stable.
In round R2 of Setting B1, a set N of new students arrive and their preference lists are
revealed to M2. The capacity of schools remain unchanged and the problem is to find a
matching, M ′ that is stable under the arrival of new students which minimizes the number of
students who are assigned to a different school in M ′. In Setting B2, a set H ′ of new schools
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arrive and the City allows the capacities of the original schools to increase. The preference
lists of the students are updated to reflect these new schools, we again require that M2
compute a new stable matching, M ′ over the updated preference lists that minimizes the
number of students who get matched to a different school in M ′.
1.2 Related work
Besides the references pointed out above on school choice, in this section, we will concentrate
on recent work on dynamic matching markets, especially those pertaining to school choice.
Feigenbaum et. al. [12] study the following issue that arises in NYC public high schools,
which admits over 80,000 students annually: after the initial centralized allocation, about 10%
of the students choose not attend the school allocated to them, instead going to private or
charter schools. To deal with this, [12] give a two-round solution which maintains truthfulness
and efficiency and minimizes the movement of students between schools.
An interesting phenomena that has been observed in matching markets is unraveling, under
which matches are made early to beat the competition, even though it leads to inefficiencies
due to unavailability of full information. A classic case, indeed one that motivated the
formation of centralized clearing houses, is that of the market for medical interns in which
contracts for interns were signed two years before the future interns would even graduate
[19]. A theoretical explanation of this phenomena was recently provided by [11].
[17] point out that stable pairings may not necessarily last forever, e.g., a student may
switch from private to public school or a married couple may divorce. They study dynamic,
multi-period, bilateral matching markets and they define and identify sufficient conditions
for the existence of a dynamically stable matching.
[7] develops a notion of stability that applies in markets where matching opportunities
arrive over time, much like the seats in our work. One of the things shown in this paper is
that agents’ incentive to wait for better matching opportunities can make achieving stability
very difficult. Indeed, the notion of dynamic stability given in this paper is a necessary
condition which a matching must satisfy in order that agents do not to find it profitable to
game a mechanism by showing up in later rounds.
A number of recent papers [24, 6, 5, 10] consider the consequences of having a mechanism
that repeats the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance algorithm multiple times, similar to our
work. Note that Deferred Acceptance is not consistent in that if one runs it, then removes
some agents and their assignments, and runs it again on the remaining agents, one does
not obtain the same assignment restricted to the left-over agents. In these papers, the
authors show that there is room for manipulation by submitting empty lists in the first round.
However, unlike our model in which changes are introduced in round R2, in all these papers,
there is nothing that motivates running Deferred Acceptance twice, namely no arrivals of
new students, no change in capacities, no changes in preferences, etc.
1.3 Overview of structural and algorithmic ideas
The main idea for obtaining a stability-preserving mechanism in round R2 for Settings A1
and A2 lies in the notion of a barrier which ensures that students admitted in R2 do not
form blocking pairs. A crucial issue is to place barriers optimally to ensure that the number
of students admitted is optimized (minimized or maximized) appropriately.
The algorithm for enumerating stable extensions of a stable matching, given in Section 4.3,
relies heavily on the fundamental structural property of stable matchings. Enumerated
matchings are extended by only one student in an iteration. At each step, the algorithm
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finds all such feasible extensions by one student in a way such that there must be at least one
feasible assignment, for any student, at each step. This assurance is crucial in guaranteeing
that the delay between any two enumerated matchings is polynomial.
For Settings B1 and B2, the mechanism proceeds by iteratively resolving blocking pairs.
Structurally, we show that the set of all minimum stable re-allocations forms a sublattice
of the stable matching lattice. Our analysis relies on the fact that the set of students who
are assigned to a different school in round R2 cannot be matched to their original school in
any minimum stable re-allocation. This lets us divide the set of students into two groups,
students matched to the same school (fixed students), and students matched to different
schools (moving students). We then construct a smaller stable matching instance, I, over the
set of moving students. By appropriately placing barriers for each student and school in I
we can ensure that the union of any stable matching in I and the matching restricted to the
fixed students will also be stable. This stable matching is a minimum stable re-allocation
and defines a bijection between the set of minimum stable re-allocations and set of stable
matchings in I, we exploit the lattice structure of the latter.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The stable matching problem for school choice
The stable matching problem takes as input a set H = {h1, h2, . . . , hm} of m public schools
and a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} of n students who are seeking admission to the schools. Each
school hj ∈ H has an integer-valued capacity, c(j), stating the maximum number of students
that can be assigned to it. If hj is assigned c(j) students, we will say that hj is filled, and
otherwise it is under-filled.
Each student si ∈ S has a strict and complete preference list, l(si), over H ∪ {∅}. If
si prefers ∅ to hj , then it prefers remaining unassigned rather being assigned to school hj .
We will assume that the list l(si) is ordered by decreasing preferences. Therefore, if si
prefers hj to hk, we can equivalently say that hj appears before hk or hk appears after hj
on si’s preference list. Clearly, the order among the schools occurring after ∅ on si’s list is
immaterial, since si prefers remaining unassigned rather than being assigned to any one of
them. Similarly, each school hj ∈ H has a strict and complete preference list, l(hj), over
S ∪ {∅}. Once again, for each student si occurring after ∅, hj prefers remaining under-filled
rather than admitting si, and the order among these students is of no consequence.
Given a set of schools, H ′ ⊆ H, by the best school for si in H ′ we mean the school that
si prefers the most among the schools in H ′. Similarly, given a set of students, S′ ⊆ S, by
the best student for hj in S′ we mean the student whom hj prefers the most among the
students in S′.
A matching M is a function, M : S → H ∪ {∅} such that if M(si) = hj then it must be
the case that si prefers hj to ∅ and hj prefers si to ∅; if so, we say that student si is assigned
to school hj . If M(si) = ∅, then si is not assigned to any school. The matching M also has
to ensure that the number of students assigned to each school hj is at most c(j).
For a matching M , a student-school pair (si, hj) is said to be a blocking pair if si is not
assigned to hj , si prefers hj to M(si) and one of the following conditions holds:
1. hj prefers si to one of the students assigned to hj , or
2. hj is under-filled and hj prefers si to ∅.
The blocking pair is said to be type 1 (type 2 ) if the first (second) condition holds. A
matching M is said to be stable if there is no blocking pair for it.
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I Theorem 1 (Rural Hospitals Theorem [20]).
1. Over all the stable matchings of the given instance: the set of matched students is the
same and the number of students matched to each school is also the same.
2. Assume that school h is not matched to capacity in a stable matching. Then, the set of
students matched to h is the same over all stable matchings.
2.2 The Stable Matching Lattice
I Definition 2. A Lattice L = (S,), is defined over a finite set S, and a partial order ,
if for every pair of elements a, b ∈ S, there exists a unique least upperbound and a unique
greatest lowerbound. We call the least upperbound the join of a and b and denote it by a ∨ b,
and anagolously call the least lowerbound the meet of a and b and denote it by a ∧ b
I Definition 3. Let SM denote the set of stable matchings over given instance (S, H, c),
then for two stable matchings M, M ′ ⊆ SM , M  M ′, if and only if ∀ si ∈ S, si weakly
prefers M(si) to M ′(si)
Given two stable matchings M and M ′ consider two new maps MU and ML, defined as
follows:
MU (si) = max(M(si), M ′(si))
ML(si) = min(M(si), M ′(si))
where max is the partner si weakly prefers between M and M ′, and min is the complement
of max.
I Theorem 4 ([16]). The set of stable matchings (SM,) characterizes a finite distributive
lattice. Morever ML, MU represent the meet and join of any two stable matchings in the
lattice.
3 Our Results for the Four Settings
In round R1, the setup defined in Section 2.1 prevails andM1 simply computes the student-
optimal stable matching respecting the capacity of each school, namely c(j) for hj . Let this
matching be denoted by M , SM ⊆ S be the set of students assigned to schools by M and
L = (S − SM ) be the set of left-over students. As shown in [9],M1 is DSIC for students.
For Settings of Type A, in round R2, the City has decided to extend matching M in a
stable manner without any restrictions on extra capacity added to each school.
For Settings of Type B, in round R2 a change is made to the sets of participants, which
may cause M to no longer be a valid or stable matching. M2 then updates M to M ′ in order
to ensure a stable matching. By allowing updates, we let some students in M get unmatched
in M ′, or get matched to different schools. The City would like to minimize the number of
students who would have to change schools, or no longer be matched to a school, in going
from M to M ′. We call M ′ a minimum stable re-allocation of M . Formally, M’ is a
minimum stable re-allocation of M if M ′ is a stable matching over all participants and the
number of students si ∈ SM where M(si) 6= M ′(si) is minimized.
3.1 Type A and B Settings
Setting A1. In this setting, in round R2, the City wants to admit as many students from
L as possible in a stablity-preserving manner. We will call this problem MaxL. We will
prove the following:
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I Theorem 5. There is a polynomial time mechanismM2 that extends matching M to M ′
so that M ′ is stable w.r.t. students S and schools H. Furthermore, M2 yields the largest
matching that can be obtained by a mechanism satisfying the stated conditions.
Let k be the maximum number of students that can be added from L, as per Theorem 5.
Next, suppose that the City can only afford to add k′ < k extra seats. We show in Section
4.1 how this can be achieved while maintaining all the properties stated in Theorem 5.
Setting A2. In this setting, in round R2, in addition to the leftover set L, a set N of new
students arrive from other cities and their preference lists are revealed to mechanismM2.
Additionally, the schools also update their preference lists to include the new students. In
this setting, the City wants to give preference to students who were not matched in round
R1, i.e., L, over the new students, N . Thus it seeks the subset of N that must be admitted
to avoid blocking pairs and subject to that, maximize the subset of L that can be added,
again in a stability-preserving manner. We will call this problem MinN MaxL. We will prove
the following:
I Theorem 6. There is a polynomial time mechanismM2 that accomplishes the following:
1. It finds smallest subset N ′ ⊆ N with which the current matching M needs to be extended
in a stability-preserving manner.
2. Subject to the previous extension, it finds the largest subset L′ ⊆ L with which the
matching can be extended further in a stability-preserving manner.
Setting B1. In this setting, a set N of new students arrive from other cities in round R2.
The preference lists of schools are also updated to include students in N , though their relative
preferences between students in S ∪ {∅} are unchanged. The City wants to find a stable
matching over students S ∪N and schools H that minimizes the number of students who
are re-allocated from their original school in M .
I Theorem 7. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that finds a minimum stable
reallocation with respect to Round R1 matching M , students S ∪N , and schools H.
Setting B2. In this setting, the City has some new schools H ′ that have opened up in R2.
The preference lists of students are updated to include schools in H ′, though their relative
preferences between schools in H ∪ {∅} are unchanged. The City also allows schools in H to
increase their capacity in round R2. The City wants to find a stable matching over students
S and schools H ∪H ′ that minimizes the number of students who are re-allocated from their
original school in M .
I Theorem 8. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that finds a minimum stable
reallocation with respect to Round R1 matching M , students S, and schools H ∪H ′.
4 Mechanisms for Type A Settings
4.1 Setting A1
We will first characterize situations under which a matching is not stable, i.e., admits a
blocking pair. This characterization will be used for proving stability of matchings constructed
in round R2. For this purpose, assume that M is an arbitrary matching, not necessarily
stable nor related to the matching computed in round R1. For each school hj ∈ H, define the
least preferred student assigned to hj , denoted LPS-Assigned(hj), to be the student whom
hj prefers the least among the students that are assigned to hj .
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MaxL(M, L):
Input: Stable matching M and set L.
Output: Stable, MaxL extension of M .
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M ′(si)←M(si)
2. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier(hj)← BS-Preferring(hj).
3. L′ ← {si ∈ L | ∃hj s.t. si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj),
and hj appears before ∅ in l(si)}.
4. ∀si ∈ L′ : Feasible-Schools(si)← {hj | si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj)}.
5. ∀si ∈ L′ : M ′(si)← Best school for si in Feasible-Schools(si).
6. ∀si ∈ (L− L′) : M ′(si)← ∅.
7. Return M ′.
Figure 1 Mechanism for round R2 for problem MaxL in Setting A1.
Next, for each student si ∈ SM , define the set of schools preferred by si, denoted
Preferred-Schools(si) by {hj | si prefers hj to M(si)}; note that M(si) = ∅ is allowed in
this definition. Further, for each school hj ∈ H, define the set of students that prefer
hj over the school they are assigned to, denoted Preferring-Students(hj) to be {si | hj ∈
Preferred-Schools(si)}. Finally, define best student preferring hj , denoted BS-Preferring(hj),
to be the student whom hj prefers the best in the set Preferring-Students(hj). If Preferring-
Students(hj) = ∅ then we will define BS-Preferring(hj) = ∅; in particular, this happens if hj
is under-filled.
The mechanism M2 for round R2 for MaxL in Setting A1 is given in Figure 1. Step
1 simply ensures that the matching found byM2 extends the round R1 matching. Step 2
defines the Barrier for each school to be BS-Preferring(hj); observe that this could be ∅. Step
3 determines the set L′ ⊆ L that can be assigned schools in a stability-preserving manner
and Step 5 computes the school for each student in this subset.
For the problem of admitting fewer students, we give the following:
I Proposition 9. Let k be the total number of students added from L in round R2 in
the previous theorem and let k′ < k. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that is
stability-preserving, and extends matching M to M ′ so that |M ′| − |M | = k′.
4.2 Setting A2
The mechanism for round R2 for MinN MaxL in Setting A2 is given in Figure 2 provided in
the appendix. Suppose there is a school hj , student sk ∈ SM is assigned to it and there is a
student si ∈ N such that hj prefers si to sk. Now, if si is kept unmatched, (si, hj) will form
a blocking pair of type 1. Next suppose hj is under-filled and there is a student si ∈ N such
that hj and si prefer each other to ∅. This time, if si is kept unmatched, (si, hj) will form a
blocking pair of type 2. Motivated by this, for a student si, define the set of schools forming
blocking pairs with si, denoted Schools-FBPairs(si), to be:
Schools-FBPairs(si) = {hj ∈ H | hj prefers si to LPS-Assigned(hj), si prefers hj to ∅}⋃
{hj ∈ H | hj is under-filled and hj and si prefer each other to ∅}.
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MinN MaxL(M, N, L):
Input: Stable matching M , and sets N and L.
Output: Stable, MinN MaxL extension of M .
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M ′(si)←M(si)
2. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier1(hj)← BS-Preferring(hj).
3. N ′ ← {si ∈ N | Schools-FBPairs(si) is non-empty}.
4. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier2(hj)← Best student for hj in (N −N ′).
5. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier(hj)← Best student for hj in {Barrier1(hj), Barrier2(hj) }.
6. L′ ← {si ∈ L | ∃hj s.t. si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj),
and hj appears before ∅ in l(si)}.
7. ∀si ∈ (N ′ ∪ L′) : Feasible-Schools(si) ← {hj | si appears before Barrier(hj) in
l(hj) }
8. ∀si ∈ (N ′ ∪ L′) : M ′(si)← Best school for si in Feasible-Schools(si).
9. ∀si ∈ ((L− L′) ∪ (N −N ′)) : M ′(si)← ∅.
10. Return M ′.
Figure 2 Mechanism for round R2 for MinN MaxL in Setting A2.
Therefore, all students in N ′, computed in Step 3, need to be matched. Our mechanism
keeps all students in N −N ′ unmatched, thereby minimizing the number of students matched
from N .
We next describe the various barriers that need to be defined. The first one, defined in Step
2, plays the same role as that in Figure 1. As before, if hj is under-filled, Barrier1(hj) = ∅.
If a student si ∈ (N ′ ∪ L′) appears after Barrier1(hj) in l(hj) and is assigned to hj , then
(Barrier1(hj), hj) will form a blocking pair. The second one, Barrier2(hj) in (N−N ′) defined
in Step 4. Again, if si ∈ (N ′ ∪ L′) appears after Barrier2(hj) in l(hj) and is assigned to hj ,
then (Barrier2(hj), hj) will form a blocking pair. In step 5, Barrier(Hj) is defined to be the
more stringent of these two barriers.
The final question is which school should si ∈ N ′ be matched to? One possibility is to
compute for each student si the set
T (si) = {hj ∈ H | ∃sk s.t. M(sk) = hj , hj prefers si to sk, and si prefers hj to ∅},
and match si to her best school in T (si).
Assume that si is matched to hj under this scheme. A blocking pair may arise as follows:
Assume si prefers school hk to hj (of course, hk /∈ T (si)), some student sl ∈ L′ has been
assigned to hk and hk prefers si to sl. If so, (si, hk) will form a blocking pair. One remedy is
to redefine the barrier for hk so sl is not assigned to hk. However, this will make the barrier
more stringent and the resulting mechanism will, in general, match fewer students from L
than our mechanism. The latter is as follows: simply match si to the best school which
prefers her to the Barrier of that school.
I Theorem 10. There is a polynomial time mechanismM2 that finds the largest subset of
(N ∪ L) that can be matched to schools and added to the current matching while maintaining
stability. This mechanism also solves MaxN MaxL and MaxLMaxN .
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StableExtension(M, c, N):
Input: Stable matching M , capacity c, new students N = {s1, s2 . . . sk}.
Output: Stable extensions of M , with polynomial delay.
M0 ←M
A1 = FeasibleAssignment(M0, c, s1)
For i1 in A1:
M1 ← Starting from M0, match s1 to i1.
A2 = FeasibleAssignment(M1, c, s2).
For i2 in A2:
...
Ak = FeasibleAssignment(Mk−1, c, sk).
For ik in Ak:
Mk ← Starting from Mk−1, match sk to ik.
Enumerate Mk.
Figure 3 Algorithm for enumerating stable extensions of M .
4.3 Enumeration of Stable Extensions
In this section we show how to enumerate all the possible stable extensions of a given stable
matching with polynomial delay between any two enumerated matchings. Specifically, the
algorithm takes as input a stable matching M from S to H satisfying capacity c and a set of
new students N = {s1, s2 . . . sk} that can be added to the schools. Here the preference lists
of all schools and students are also given. The algorithm enumerates all solutions M ′ from
S ∪N to H ∪ {∅} such that:
all assignments in M are preserved in M ′, and
M ′ is stable with respect to capacity c′ where
c′(j) =
{∣∣M ′−1(hj)∣∣ if ∣∣M ′−1(hj)∣∣ > c(j),
c(j) otherwise.
(1)
Note that M ′−1(hj) is the set of students assigned to hj under M ′. We say that M ′ is a
stable extension of M with respect to N .
The complete algorithm StableExtension(M, c, N) is given in Figure 3 (Appendix).
At a high level, the algorithm maintains a stable extension Me of M with respect to a subset
N ′ of N . At each step, a student si is added to N ′ and all possible assignments A of si
that are compatible to Me are identified. In other words, adding each assignment in A to
Me gives a stable extension of M with respect to N ′ ∪ {si}. The algorithm branches to an
assignment in A and continues to the next student. When N ′ = N , the current matching is
returned. The algorithm then backtracks to a previous branching point and continues.
Figure 4 gives the subroutine for finding compatible assignments. Initially, Ai is set to
be an empty set. The subroutine then goes through the preference list of si one by one in
decreasing order. The considered school h is added to Ai and the subroutine terminates if at
least one of the following happens:
h is ∅,
h is under-filled,
h prefers si to LPS-Assigned(h) with respect to Me.
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FeasibleAssignment(Me, c, si):
Input: Stable matching Me, capacity c, student si.
Output: Set Ai of all possible assignments for si. Adding any assignment in Ai to
Me preserves stability.
1. Initilize Ai to the empty set.
2. For each h in l(si), in decreasing order of preferences, do:
a. If h = ∅ then Return Ai ∪ {∅}.
b. Else h = hj :
i. If
∣∣M−1e (hj)∣∣ < c(j) then Return Ai ∪ {hj}.
ii. If si appears before LPS-Assigned(hj) then Return Ai ∪ {hj}.
iii. If si appears after LPS-Assigned(hj) and before BS-Preferring(hj) then
Ai ← Ai ∪ {hj}.
Figure 4 Algorithm for finding feasible matches of si w.r.t. current matching Mc.
Notice that in the last two scenarios above, if si was assigned to any school after h in her
preference list, (si, h) would form a blocking pair. Assume none of the above scenarios
happens. The subroutine adds h to A and continues if h prefers si to BS-Preferring(h).
Otherwise, h prefers BS-Preferring(h) to si. Hence, assigning si to h would create a blocking
pair. The subroutine continues to the next school in this case. The following lemma says
that FeasibleAssignment correctly finds all possible assignments of a student, given the
current matching, at each step.
I Lemma 11. Let N ′ be the set of students assigned (possibly to ∅) in Me, i.e., Me is a
stable extension of M with respect to N ′. FeasibleAssignment(Me, c, si) finds all possible
assignments of si to H ∪{∅} such that adding each assignment to Me gives a stable extension
of M with respect to N ′ ∪ {si}.
I Lemma 12. FeasibleAssignment(Me, c, si) returns at least one possible assignment.
From Lemmas 11 and 12, we can prove the main theorem of this section:
I Theorem 13. StableExtension(M, c, N) enumerates all possible stable extension of M
with respect to N . Moreover, the time between any two enumerations is O((k + n)m).
5 Mechanisms for Type B Settings
5.1 Setting B1
We first show some structural properties of minimum stable re-allocations in this setting.
N ′ ⊆ N , defines the set of students who form blocking pairs with the current matching
M . SM denote the set of stable matchings over the instance I = (S ∪N, H, c), and MSR
represents the set of all minimum stable re-allocations of M . For all si ∈ N we set M(si) = ∅.
I Definition 14. si ∈ S ∪N is moved in M ′ ∈MSR, if M(si) 6= M ′(si)
I Lemma 15. All minimum stable re-allocations of M move the same set of students, SR.
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Let HR, be the set of schools that students in SR are matched to in some minimum stable
re-allocation then as an application of the Rural Hospitals Theorem we have:
I Corollary 16. All students si ∈ S∪N−SR are matched to the same school in all minimum
stable re-allocations. All minimum stable re-allocations will match students in SR to schools
in HR. Moreover, if k students from SR are matched to a school hj ∈ HR, then all minimum
stable re-allocations will have k students from SR matched to HR.
We denote the students in S∪N−SR as SF , and let MF represent the matching restricted
to these students. Then for all M ′ ∈MSR and si ∈ SF , MF (si) = M(si) = M ′(si).
Consider the stable matching instance I ′, defined below:
(a) ∀si ∈ SR, Barrier(si) = Best hj ∈ Schools-FBPairs(si) over all hj ∈ H −HR
(b) ∀hj ∈ HR, Barrier(hj) = BS-Preferring(hj) among students in SF
(c) ∀si ∈ SR, l′(si) = l(si). Place the ∅ to the immediate left of Barrier(si)
(d) ∀hj ∈ HR l′(hj) = l(hj). Place the ∅ to the immediate left of Barrier(hj)
(e) Let M ′ be some MSR, then c′(hj) = |{si ∈ SR | M ′(si) = hj}|
I ′ = (SR, HR, c′) with preference lists l′(si), l′(hj) defines a stable matching instance,
with SMI′ denoting the set of all stable matchings over I ′.
I Lemma 17. ∀ MI′ ∈ SMI′ , M ′ = MI′ ∪MF is a minimum stable re-allocation. Moreover
any M ′ ∈MSR can be decomposed into MI′ ∪MF , where MI′ ∈ SMI′ .
I Lemma 18. (MSR,) defines a sublattice of (SM,).
Adding New Students(M, N):
Input: Stable matching M and set N .
Output: Minimum stable re-allocation of M .
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M ′(si)←M(si)
2. While ∃si unmatched and (si, hj) form a blocking pair do
a. h← Best possible hi in Schools-FBPairs(si)
b. if h is filled to capacity then unmatch LPS-Assigned(h)
c. M ′(si)← h
3. Return M ′.
Figure 5 Mechanism M2 for adding new students in round R2.
The proof thatM2 finds a MSR is provided in the Appendix. As a corollary of our proof
we get:
I Corollary 19. M2 produces a student-optimal minimum stable re-allocation.
I Lemma 20. There exists a mechanismM3, that finds a school-optimal minimum stable
re-allocation in polynomial time.
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5.2 Setting B2
A first approach to finding a minimum stable re-allocation in Setting B2 would be to run
Gale-Shapley over the whole instance. However unlike Setting B1, Example 21 shows that
this could require as many as |S| possible re-allocations.
I Example 21. Let there be n+1 students and schools. The preference lists (mod n+1) for any
student si is (hi−1, hi, ..., hi−2) and the preference list for any school hj is (sj , sj+1, ..., sj−1).
In round R1, all participants but hn+1 are present and each school has 1 seat. In round R2,
hn+1 arrives with capacity 1. The only stable matching from round R1 would match each si
to hi and sn+1 would remain unmatched. Assigning sn+1 to hn+1 would result in a stable
matching requiring no re-allocations. However, running Gale-Shapley over all participants
would yield a matching of each si to hi−1, but this matching requires n re-allocations.
I Lemma 22. Each student weakly improves in any minimum stable reallocation.
I Remark 23. The lattice structure shown in the previous section carries over to this Setting
as well. This follows since both Settings B1 and B2 can be reduced to an instance where
schools have unit capacity. Consider the unit capacity setting: a stable matching is found in
round R1, and in round R2 a set of new participants arrive on one side. Since each school
has unit capacity, schools and students become interchangeable.
I Lemma 24. (MSR,) is a sublattice of (SM,). MoreoverM2 finds the school-optimal
minimal stable re-allocation.
Adding New Schools(M, H ′):
Input: Stable matching M and set H ′.
Output: Minimum stable re-allocation of M .
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M ′(si)←M(si)
2. While ∃hj ∈ H ∪H ′ with unmet-capacity and BS-Preferring(hj) 6= ∅:
a. Break current match if exists of BS-Preferring(hj)
b. M ′ ←M ′ ∪ (BS-Preferring(hj), hj)
3. Return M ′.
Figure 6 Mechanism M2 for adding new schools in round R2.
I Lemma 25. There exists a mechanismM3, that finds a student-optimal minimum stable
re-allocation in polynomial time.
6 Incentive Compatibility
For the four settings discussed, it would be highly desirable if we could prove that mechanism
M2 in round R2 is DSIC. We show that for Setting B1 that this truly is the case. Unfortu-
nately for Settings A1, A2 and B2 we show that the current mechanisms outlined above are
not incentive compatible. We relax DSIC and consider the weaker notion of a mechanism
for which incentive compatibility is a Nash equilibrium (ICNE). Under such a mechanism, a
student cannot gain by misreporting her choices, if all other students are truthful. We show
that no mechanisms in round R2 for Setting A1, A2 and B2 can be even ICNE.
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I Lemma 26. M2 in Setting B1 is DSIC for students.
I Lemma 27. There is no pair of stability-preserving, ICNE mechanism (M1,M2) for
Setting A1 and A2.
I Lemma 28. There is no pair of stability-preserving, ICNE mechanism (M1,M2) for
Setting B2.
The key distinction for incentive compatibility between Setting A1,A2 and B1, is that
in B1 if a student is unmatched after round R1 it will remain unmatched after round R2.
However in Settings A1, A2 we try to accommodate students who were unmatched after
round R1, so they still have a chance to get matched in R2. This providies the possibility of
affecting the matching produced in R1 by misreporting their preference list so as to make
the Barriers computed byM2 more favorable for them.
7 NP-Hardness Results
I Problem 29. A different version of Setting A2, the City wants to extend original matching
M so that it maximizes the number of students who get matched from L, and subject to this,
minimize the number of students who get matched from N . (maxLminN )
I Problem 30. Same setting as Problem 29, but the City wants to maximize the number of
students who get matched from N , and subject to this, minimize the number of students who
get matched from L. (maxN minL)
I Problem 31. A set of new students N arrive in round R2. The City wants to extend
the matching to include k students from N , such that it maximizes the number of students
matched from L.
I Problem 32. In round R2, we are allowed to re-allocate some students matched in round R1
in order to match more students from L. Find a stable matching that maximizes the number
of students matched from L, and subject to this, minimizes the number of re-allocations made.
I Problem 33. In the single round setting, given a set of students, and schools with strictly
ordered preference lists l(s), l(h) respectively, and a weight function w(j) over the edges of
students to schools, find a vector of capacities for the schools and a stable matching with
respect to this vector that maximizes the total weight.
I Theorem 34. Problems 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 are NP-hard.
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